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DIVISIBIUTY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE COMPETITIVE
POTENTIAL OF REGIONAL AIRUNES
Stanley A. Fawcett and Stanley E. Fawcett
ABSTRACT
During the 12 years following deregulation of,the airline industry, tremendous change has taken
place involving both industry structure and industry competition. Much of the discussion
concerning these changes has not fully considered the factor supply side of the industry,
especially with respect to emerging technology and factor indivisibility. However, new technology
airframe and engine design (turboprop and turbofan) and the use of new materials promises to
mitigate the problems associated with aircraft size. The availability of this new technology will
enable regional air carriers to implement new competitive strategies such as regional hubbing
and hub bypassing. This paper discusses the impact of technology on the competitive potential
of regional airlines, looking at the benefits of and impediments to such competition.
INTRODUCTION
In the years following the passage of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, a tremendous
body of literature discussing the competitive
implications of airline deregulation has
appeared (Levine, 1987). Much of this literature
has addressed the applicability of the theory of
contestable markets to the airline industry. In a
macroeconomic sense, if prices, wages, and
salaries are perfectly flexible, they would move
instantaneously to clear the market at all times.
Recognizing this, contestability or any other
theory cannot fully explain a market that has
restraints on the factors side. Unions,
governmental policies (Federal Aviation
Administration [FAA] policies), airports, and
other restraints exist, blocking a free flow of
actors. Switching costs (frequent flyer
programs) and other constraints further
complicate market operations in the airline
industry. Considerable attention has also been
given to the issue of airline mergers and the
resulting industry c.oncentration. Other issues
widely discussed include airport congestion,
airline profitability, development of hub and
spoke route systems, employee relations in a
deregulated environment, and the overall
efficacy of airline deregulation. Despite this
widespread interest in the airline industry,
several important issues have been
overlooked. For example, the factor input
market (the factor supply side of the airline
industry) has received comparatively little
attention. Perhaps two of the most important
issues concerning the factor market include
the availability of skilled labor (in particular,
pilots and mechanics) and the development
and application of new technology.
The focus of this paper is on the application
to the airline industry of new technology, with
particular emphasis on emerging technology's
potential to alter the structure and
competitiveness of the industry. A brief
overview of the impact of technology
application on the airline industry is presented
by looking at the relationships between
technology and two of the industry's primary
input factors--Iabor and capital.
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The impact of technology on divisibility and
industry structure is then reviewed. Finally,
specific technological developments and their
potential application to the industry are
discussed from the perspective of industry
competition. The paper concludes with a
summary and a discussion of policy
implications.
TECHNOLOGY AND COST OF
FACTOR INPUTS
The primary production factors purchased by
regional airlines are labor, fuel, management,
and capital. Capital is represented mainly by
aircraft, spare parts, maintenance facilities,
ground handling equipment, and other leased
facilities. The largest labor factor cost
components are costs of operating a
scheduled air transport system--the costs
involved in generating capacity on the routes.
These costs account for nearly three-fourths of
the total labor factor costs. Conversely,
passenger and freight servicing costs are
about one-fifth of the total labor factor costs
(Douglas & Miller, 1978). Combined, labor
costs exceed 40 per cent of total costs for the
airlines. Over time, changes in production
technology have impacted each of the factor
inputs.
Production technology's primary impact on
the labor factor cost has been largely one of
increasing labor productivity. With these
improvements in productivity, improved
profitability should result. However, because
the purchase of labor takes place in a
restricted marketwith considerable interference
from governmental agencies, many of the
productivity gains resulting from the application
of new technology have been dissipated by
high wages and salaries. This technology-labor
relationship can be best illustrated by looking
at the role of the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA). Since many of the early airline
founders were pilots recently released from the
military, pilots have historically possessed a
strong power base within the traditional
incumbent carriers. The overall position of
pilots has continued to be strong because of
the very low short-run demand elasticity for
their services. This position is perpetuated by
such factors as the rivalry in oligopolistic
markets for a limited supply of qualified pilots,
the rigidities of technology, and federal safety
regulation. From their influential position, the
pilots have not only played a pervasive role in
management decisions, but have also been
very successful in pressing for high wage
levels--increases that were not resisted by the
airlines under regulation.
Indeed, wage settlements have historically
allocated large proportions of productivity
gains to pilots. For example, in the 1951-52
period, the pilots association successfully
sought modification of the speed component
of the pay schedule so that the cost per mile
of a pilot's services increased with the number
of miles flown in a month. The aim was to
protect the number of jobs in the face of rapid
increases in aircraft speed. Other adjustments
in pilots' wages have effectively absorbed
improvements in productivity brought on by
such key technology gains as the development
and adoption of jet and wide-body aircraft, as
well as the more recent automation of many
pilot and flight engineering functions. From its
prominent position, ALPA has developed a
negotiating strategy that resists industry-wide
bargaining in favor of single-carrier bargaining
to establish general precedents for contract
settlement. The very success of this
·whipsawingll technique caused considerable
distortion in airline labor markets when
deregulation occurred (Caves, 1962). (The
International Association of Machinists [lAM]
use very similar tactics.) The modification of
mutual assistance pacts by the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 has further served to
perpetuate the position of influence held by
airline pilots in today's dynamic marketplace.
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During the early part of the deregulation era,
a number of carriers successfully resisted the
demands of pilots and mechanics. This
success was a result of the intensified
competition brought on by new entry airlines
such as PeopleExpress and America West as
non-union carriers. Eastern Airlines is a very
good case study of entrenched labor unions
and public policy actions·which .constrain
market forces on the factor supply side.
Eastern's human resources policies were a
contributing factor, but management direction
was correct though not successful (Borman,
1988; and "Unions...," 1988).
This new competition forced ALPA to accept
the establishment of two-scale pay systems for
pilots. Even so, the recently negotiated
contract at Delta Air Lines together with
increased industry concentration and the
potential return to oligopoly competition
suggest that substantive technology-related
productivity gains continue to be susceptible to
labor demands ("Proposed Delta... ,11 1990).
While Delta did retain the B scale for its pilots,
this scale has been considerably modified in
favor of the pilots. Delta did gain an increased
work month from 75 hours to 80 hours, but
had to guarantee a fall back to 75 hours
before any pilot could be furloughed if the
company's operations are scaled back in the
future. American Airlines has negotiated a
similar contact with their pilots' union, the
Allied Pilots Association.
Production technology's impact on the
capital input cost has been quite different from
that on labor and has indirectly led to the
current structure of most major airline
operation. The service nature of airline
competition makes the economics of
scheduled air transportation complex. Because
scheduled service cannot be stored, current
consumption must come entirely from current
production. Further, the necessary capacity for
the production of scheduled air service is
provided by an airline's capital stock
(equipment). Unfortunately, capacity is
produced only in discrete units equivalent to
the number of seats available on the plane
being flown to provide city-pair service. Thus,
a definite challenge exists in matching capacity
supplied to capacity demanded--once a plane
takes off, each empty seat represents capacity
.that, is . lost forever. This challenge of
economically supplying adequate capacity is
exacerbated both by a pricing structure that
encourages schedule augmentation as a
means of non-price competition and by an
existing' bias toward the use of large, jet
aircraft. The bias toward larger aircraft occurs
because the production function for airline
service is characterized by variable
proportions--plane choice therefore represents
a principal means of factor substitution. For
each unit of production (seat-mile or ton-mile)
which can be produced with a Metro IV or a
DC-9, the DC-9 is the more capital-intensive
and labor-conserving choice. Also, airlines
have sought to minimize the number of
different airplane types in their fleets for
efficient maintenance purposes. Similarly,
airframe manufacturers, operating under
conditions of considerable uncertainty, have
biased their research and development efforts
to the largest single airline market--typically
toward long-haul, luxury aircraft. The result of
these practices is that scheduled air
transportation tends toward I'excessl • capacity.
In an industry that requires a capacity
utilization (load factor) of approximately 60% to
be profitable, the utilization of larger, faster
planes that has come about through
technological innovation (and persists because
of customer preference) has created a
service/capacity dilemma. That is, the preferred
use of large, jet aircraft by the major airlines to
serve various routes cannot always be
economically justified on a capacity demanded
basis. The core of this dilemma is created by
38
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the indivisibility of the major capital input--the have developed largely as a response by the
airplane. (Indivisibilities: The inability to divide major airlines to the challenge of matching
some factor unit of production such as capital capacity supplied to capacity demanded. That
equipment into smaller units without either is, hub-and-spoke route networks represent
complete loss of usefulness in production or the airlines' operational response to the
partial loss of efficiency. It is not always economic problem of indivisible capital inputs.
possible to adjust all factor inputs in the same The basic objective of hub-and-spoke systems
proportions). One widely adopted approach to is to gather passengers from a variety of
overcoming the service/capacity·dilemma has - ·outlying, low-density points and bring them
been the development of hub-and-spoke route together at a central location (the hub airport)
networks. The major airlines have been able to and then redistribute them to the outlying
circumvent the service/capacity dilemma while points or to another hub. By developing hub-
further partitioning competition within the and-spoke operations, the airlines are better
overall industry. The relationship between able to utilize today's large jet aircraft to serve
technology and industry structure is discussed lower-density, city-pair markets with
in greater depth in the following section. satisfactory load factors (Phillips, 1985).
In summary, technology's impact on the Hubbing potentially enables the major airlines
airline industry's controllable factor inputs-- to overcome the service/capacity complication.
labor and capital--has played two very This practice allows economical service to
important roles in the development of today's many more cities by increasing both the
airline industry. First, technological efficiency and effectiveness of the larger,
development, especially in the areas of jet Ilindivisiblell jet aircraft. The economics of
propulsion, aircraft size, and flight management hubbing have proven so pervasive that U.S.
systems, has enhanced productivity and carriers operated forty-nine hubs at thirty-one
provided air carriers with a viable competitive airports at the beginning of 1987 (Fawcett and
advantage over other for-hire passenger Fawcett, 1988). Further, new hubs continue to
transportation modes. This is true despite the be developed each year, and the widespread
fact that many of the productivity gains have use of hub-and-spoke routing has been called
been leveraged away by various labor groups. the most significant development in airline
Second, the economies created by this same operations since the era of deregulation
technological development, principally jet began.
propulsion and larger aircraft, has created a While the utilization of hub-and-spoke
service/capacity dilemma stemming from an networks has allowed the major airlines to take
indivisible capital input. This service/capacity advantage of technological advances in aircraft
problem has promoted recent and widespread development, many of the benefits and
changes in industry route structure, leading to problems that have resulted promise to
the dominance of hub-and-spoke routing. influence the future development of the
Thus, technological advancement has served industry. As stated, the greatest advantage of
both to promote and to limit airline hubbing comes from the more efficient use of
competition. aircraft and personnel which increases the
TECHNOLOGY, DIVISIBILITY, AND number of city-pairs that can be served
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE economically by an airline.
As previously suggested, the hub-and-spoke Other benefits of hub-and-spoke systems
networks that operate at most major airports include a reduction in dependency on other
39
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airlines for interlining and improvement in
schedule frequency during peak hours, a
higher retention rate of passengers on-line,
and the development of traffic feed through the
hub. In addition, when hubs become highly
concentrated, the hubbing or dominant carrier
can use its market position to impose costs on
potential new entrants.
The problems associated with hubbing .have
come about largely because hub-and-spoke
operations typically require the bunching of
flights around peak times--planes arrive in
short time blocks, change passengers, and
then depart in a very short time span. The
result is often a greater frequency of
congestion, confusion, and delays. In reality,
the use of hubs transfers much of the daily
traffic at key airports to small time intervals,
causing severe capacity constraints during
these peak periods. In addition, because flights
are inter-dependent in a hub system, if a
problem occurs in one area, it has a ripple
effect throughout the system. Hubbing also
presents public policy makers with some very
difficult questions concerning antitrust
violations and overall industry competitiveness.
The ideal operational system would provide
the benefits of hubbing without creating the
attendant problems. To this end, a number of
new developments in aircraft and engine
technology that considerably enhance factor
input divisibility will provide opportunities to
modify industry operating structure. These
advances in technology are making it possible
to substantially reduce the size of the discrete
unit of production capacity while offering many
of the benefits of the larger jet aircraft--speed
(flight duration), comfort, and perceived safety.
Such technology changes are improving the
economic viability of hUbbing many medium
sized airports for regional air service. These
changes also have the potential to make
smaller regional and commuter air carriers
more attractive for providing direct service to
many city-pair markets (by-passing hubs).
These two changes would not only potentially
increase the level of competition in the airline
industry, but also mitigate many of the
problems associated with the current operation
of large 110rtressll hub airports.
TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITION
The competitive environment in the airline
.industry has evolved continually throughout the
deregulatory era. The initial increase in new
entry and competition that occurred during the
first six years of deregulation has been
followed by six years of increasing industry
concentration.
This increase in concentration has been
particularly acute in major hub markets, which
have been established by the airlines to
overcome the problem of divisibility and take
advantage of economies of density,
information, and scope. Today, many hub
markets are so highly concentrated (Table 1
next page) that the level of industry
competitiveness is now questioned--many feel
the industry is close to reaching a point where
the major airlines will be able to effectively
partition the market to avoid aggressive fare
competition (Nomani, 1990). Further, the ability
of new airlines to enter the industry has
become somewhat doubtful (Brenner, 1988;
Fawcett and Farris, 1989).
One possible source of competition currently
exists in the form of the commuter or regional
airline group. Certainly, the marketing
agreements, code sharing,. and equity shares
by the major carriers inhibit the competitive
potential of regional lines; even so, a number
of regionals continue to possess operating and
marketing flexibility. Further, future public
policy action could be directly targeted at
improving the competitive ability of the regional
carriers. This future flexibility combined with
continu.ed growth, good earnings, and financial
stability indicates that competitive opportunities
do exist for regional carriers (Moxon,
40
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1988;Stynes, 1989a; IIU.S. Commuter...," 1989).
In fact, regionals carried 31.8 million
passengers in 1987 and in excess of 34 million
in 1988, with market projections indicating that
the regional airlines will experience growth
rates as high as 7-1 0 percent per year
through the end of this century. Much of this
79AVERAGE
expected growth will result from the acquisition
of the new, high technology, high speed
turboprop and turbofan aircraft (Moxon, 1989;
Moxon and Bailey, 1989; IIRegional
Airlines...,111989).
This emerging aircraft technology will
improve the operating economics, speed,
comfort, and safety of the regional airlines.
Table 1 .,~ This new .equipment will serve to provide
Concentration * Ratios at Large Hub Airports enhanced opportunities to both hub and
Four-Firm Concentration smaller airports; competitive regional air
~~H~u~b~~~~~~R~~~~~s~(~1~98~8~)~~~_ service;andp~nt~o-pointserv~etoanumber
Chicago (O'Hare) 88 of key city-pair markets, thereby by-passing
Atlanta 96 large hub cities.
Dallas/Ft. Worth 94 The ability to hub smaller airports presents
Los Angeles 60 opportunities for passengers to avoid the
Denver 92
83 congestion and accompanying delays thatNewark
San Francisco 68 often exist at major hub airports. Further, some
New York (laGuardia) 61 of the circuitry in current routings can be
Boston 65 avoided, reducing the number and duration of
New York (Kennedy) 80 layovers and the total passenger travel time
Washington (National) 61 from origin to final destination. Much of the
Pittsburgh 93 service created by this type of regional
Minneapolis/St. Paul 89 hubbing activity would be limited to regional
Phoenix 75 city-pair combinations because of the limited
Miami 79 range of most of the smaller regional aircraft.
Houston (Intercontinental) 91 Nevertheless, competitive regional service
Detroit 80 provided by regional and commuter airlines
Seattle 67 would not only help reduce congestion at
Las Vegas 7639 many high-density airports, but alsoPhiladelphia
Charlotte 97 adequately fulfill many of the air transportation
Salt Lake City 94 needs in the dense markets of the Midwest,
St. Louis 91 Northeast, Atlantic Seaboard, and Pacific
Tampa 72 Coast region.
Additionally, many city-pair markets that
currently lack the traffic necessary for the
major airlines to provide point-to-point service
(Adapted from: Airport Activity Statistics of the (hub-and-spoke service is provided) could be
Certified Route Air Carriers: U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1988.) effectively and competitively served on a point-
to-point basis. That this type of Ilhub by-
* Concentration is a major form of measuring market power in an passingll approach could be successful and
industry. The concentration ratio is the percent of the market provide substantive competitive advantage,
controlled by the largest (4,8,20) firms in the market, and it is of
strategic importance in management decision making. when the problem of divisibility can be
overcome, is evidenced by the large
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(Adapted from: Airport Activity Statistics of the
Certified Route Air Carriers: U.S. Department of
Transportation. 1988.)
are routed through the hub in order to fill
capacity on the "Iarger- jet aircraft operated by
the major airlines. Point-to-point service would
reduce total travel time by eliminating layovers
while heightening passengerconvenience. Hub
bypassing will come into greater focus as
industry concentration and hub congestion
become more problematic from economic and
policy perspectives. The discussion will now
turn to the new aircraft and technological
developments that will make regional hubbing
and hub bypassing by regionals competitively
viable options.
Many of today's technological improvements
are manifested primarily in newly developed
fuel efficient aircraft, which will help overcome
the problem of factor indivisibility. These new
aircraft will be powered by new technology
turboprop and high-bypass-ratio turbofan
engines, and will be equipped with the same
flight control automation as larger commercial
airplanes, and will help the regionals open new
markets. Automation includes full-authority
digital engine control (FADEC), automated
flight management systems, inertial reference
systems (IRS), electronic flight instrument
systems (EFIS), and electronic engine and
systems display (all glass cockpits).
Materials research is producing lighter
weight, stronger, materials such as metal-
matrix composite materials, new light weight
metal alloys, carbon fibre reinforced plastics,
glass-fibre reinforced materials which are being
coupled with an increasing use of ceramics.
Douglas aircraft projects that the new
generation aircraft will contain 60 to 80 percent
of these new materials in their structure,
resulting in lighter weight, reduced drag, and
increased fuel efficiency while simultaneously
strengthening the airframe. Fuel burn will be
decreased by allowing higher temperatures in
the combustion chamber.
49
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58
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03
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61
44
27
06
41
32
15
15
22
76
54
58
27
69
05
33
Chicago (O'Hare)
Atlanta
Dallas/Ft. Worth
Los Angeles
Denver
Newark
San Francisco
New York (laGuardia)
Boston
New York (Kennedy)
Washington (National)
Pittsburgh
Minneapolis/St. Paul
Phoenix
Miami
Houston (IntercontinentaO
Detroit
Seattle
Las Vegas
Philadelphia
Charlotte
Salt Lake City
St. Louis
Kansas City
Memphis
Tampa
AVERAGE
Hub
percentage of through passengers found at
many hub airports (Table 2). Fifty percent or
more of the passengers enplaned at eight
hubs are connecting passengers. Many of
these connecting Ctthroughll) passengerswould
be greatly benefitted by point-to-point service
on these routes since they neither begin nor
end their flights in the hub airport, but rather
Table 2
Percentage of Through Passengers at
Selected Hub Airports
Percentage of Through
Passengers (1988)
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Table 3
Comparison of Turboprop Aircraft ##
PERFORMANCE
MAXPAYLOAO lO'QFWG:
MAX CRUISE MAX SEATING (Lbs.) WITH FULL
AIRCRAFT TYPE ENGINEOO SPEED(Kts) PITCH(Ins.) RANGE(n.m.) R.B.T~
+BAe Super J31 2 GA TPE331-12UAR 295 19/32 4,200/430 1,078/2,223
+Beech 19000 2 PYlC PT6A-67D 290 19/31 4,482/672 2,153/1 ,612
00228 2 GA TPE331-5 231 19/30 4,482/672 4,156/1,638
F SA-227AC 2 GA TPE331-11U 278 20/30 4,720/290 1,078/2,223
++CBA 123 2 GA TPE351-2O 355 19/31 4,751/320 1,991/1,650
+BAe J41 2 GA TPE331-14HR 295 29/30 N/A N/A
+EMB 120 2 PYlC 118A 316 30/31 6,691/300 3,040/1 ,575
+Saab 3408 2 GE CT-7-9B 282 37/30 8,285/643 5,117/1 ,848
++00 338 2 PYlC 119 350+ 30/32 N/A N/A
B/OHC 8-100 2 PYlC 120 271 40/31 8,440/840 6,262/1,520
ATR42 2 PYlC 120 265 50/30 10,835/520 4,239/2,500
+Fokker 50 2 PYlC 125B 282 50/32 13,404/796 9,270/1 ,876
B/DHC 8-300 2 PYlC 123 286 56/29 11,600/830 9,822/1 ,350
++Saab 2000 2 GMA 2100 360+ 50/32 13,000/1 ,110 9,993/1 ,993
+BAeATP 2 PYlC 126A 266 64/31 12,800/1,860 8,330/1 ,860
++B/OHC 8-400 2 GLC 38 or GMA 2100 370 60-70/33-30 N/A N/A
Compiled from various issues of Flight International and Aviation Week & Space Technology.
These aircraft contain a high level of new technology.
++ These aircraft contain the highest level of new technology.
The engine manufacturers are: GE=General Electric; GLC=General Electric/Lycoming partnership; GMA=General Motors/
Allison; GA=Garrett; PWC=Pratl & Whitney Canada.
Turboprop Technology
Most regional airlines operate 19-50 seat
aircraft with -'turbopropll power plants (see
Table 3 for a comparison of turboprop aircraft).
These aircraft are presently much slower than
l'turbofanll Oet) aircraft on routes in excess of
250 miles, and most have a very limited range.
Relatively high levels of noise and vibration
have reduced the passenger appeal of these
smaller turboprop airplane. An example of the
new, and potentially very competitive,
technology is the CA-123 by Embracer of Brazil
and FAA of Argentina. (CA stands for
IIcooperation Brazil. and Argentina.)
The first flight of the CA-123 occurred on
July 19, 1990. Important features of this aircraft
include supercritical wings, Garrett TPF351-20
43
pusher turboprop engines with greatly
improved aerodynamic six blade propellers, a
37,000 foot ceiling, and a cruise speed in
excess of 350 knots with very low cabin noise
and vibration levels. The CA-123 should not
only prove a popular choice for the regionals,
but also overcome many of the competitive
problems--speed, comfort, and perceived
safety--associated with 19-seat aircraft.
The CA-123 has been ordered by a number
of regional carriers because of its high speed
and what Jerry Atkin, president of Skywest,
calls the CA-123's ability to develop IIhub-
raiding or hub-bypass marketsll (IiEmbraer
Signs Up ... ,11 1989; Fotos, 1989b). A
stretched very high-bypass-ratio turbofan or an
ultra high bypass (UHB) unducted fan (UDF)
8
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engine powered CA-123 will be a natural
evolution.
Several new technology aircraft in the 30-
seat class became available to the regional
airlines in the early 1980s. The 30 seat
Embracer EMB-120 Brasilia and 30+ seat
Saab/Fairchiid SF-340 appear to be the most
popular. The EMB-120 is the fastest of the 30-
seat turboprops with a cruise speed of 300-315
knots, and the airplane has very high reliability.
This aircraft is operated by the Delta
Connection carriers such as Atlantic Southeast,
Comair, Skywest, and a number of others
(IiComair Orders... ,'- 1989). The SF-340 is a
state-of-the-art technology airplane jointly
designed and build by Fairchild Aircraft and
Saab Aircraft International (Saab/Scania) of
Sweden. (Fairchild is no longer a partner in the
340.) The SF-340 has an all-glass cockpit and
maintainability features not found on other
aircraft in its class. Both airplanes have
experienced avery high passenger acceptance
level.
A third 33-seat airplane soon to be available
is the Dornier 328 manufactured by the Dornier
division of Deutsche Aerospace (DASA)
(Mecham, 1990). The Dornier 328 will have a
state-of-the-art airframe, with the use of
considerable composite material and improved
aerodynamics. Newly designed six blade
propellers formed from carbonfibre laminates
with a light weight foam core feeding into a
split aluminum hub will improve the cruise
speed to better than 350 knots while reducing
the vibration and noise levels inside the cabin.
Midway Airlines has ordered 33 of this type
with options for 40 more (News Briefs, 1989).
Several other quality planes in this class are
available and operated by the regional airlines.
Saab Aircraft International has committed to
the development of a new technology stretch
derivative of its popular SF-340 designated the
Saab 2000. This airplane will seat 50
passengers at a 32 inch seat pitch with the
same comfort level and better interior noise
level (76 dBA [decibals measured on the A-
weighted scale to factor out anomalies]) as the
MD 80, which is the present standard for
comfort in narrow body jet airplanes. Jeff
Marsh, president of Saab Aircraft International
believes that a high-speed 50-seat airplane is
needed to capitalize on a distinct new market
opportunity-the growing demand from
business travelers bypass hubs flying longer
(300-700 n.m. [n.m. is nautical mile and is
approximately 15% longer than a statute mile])
direct inter-regional routes between secondary
city-pair markets. The Saab 2000 will deliver
near-jet speed (Mach 0.62/360kt) to make them
competitive on many 500 n.m. sectors with a
block speed of only minutes longer than the
turbofan Canadair Regional Jet (RJ). However,
the Saab 2000 will burn 30 percent less fuel for
a minimum 15 percent direct operating cost
advantage per seat (Shifrin, 1989; Middleton,
1989).
To summarize, a trend toward the use of
faster and larger aircraft began during the
1980s. As this trend continues in the 1990s,
many regional airlines will replace their 19-seat
airplanes with 30-seat airplanes, especially on
routes that maintain load factors of 70 percent
or more. For example, Express Airline 1 is
replacing its 19-seat BAe-J31 s with the Saab-
340B and the new Saab-2000. The end result
of this trend will be an increase in the
competitive position of the regional airlines--
larger, faster aircraft prOVide a better level of
service, less noise, and greater passenger
appeal.
The acceptance of the EMB-120, SF-340B,
and the BAe-146 by business travelers
suggests that regional airlines can compete
effectively when they operate quality airplanes.
Turbofan Technology
Since jet aircraft are viewed more favorably
than turboprop aircraft in terms of safety,
speed, and comfort, especially by business
44
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travelers and other passengers on longer
routes, the advent of the regional jet
represents an even greater opportunity for
regional airlines to compete with major airlines
through hub bypassing strategies. Canadair
executive vice-president Robert Wohl (Gould,
1989a) has discussed the potential competitive
impact of the regional jet:
When passenger jet travel arrived in the
Western world about 30 years ago, it
revolutionized the way ordinary people
viewed travel, and it changed forever our
traveling habits. We at Canadair think the
same thing will happen with the advent of
the Regional Jet.
For at least the last decade, air transport in
North America and Western Europe has been
based on a bigger-is-better approach, with
bigger and better aeroplanes feeding the
rapidly expanding hub airports. As this system
has grown, it has shown its limits. The hub-
and-spoke system we have built in the name of
efficiency has been swamped. Instead of flying
150 passengers into a major hub, when
perhaps a third of them want· to go to a
different destination, why not fly those 50
passengers directly? (Gould, 1989a)
Airline analyst Steve Horner argues that
regional jets possess strong competitive
potential: "its time has come, with the capacity
issue at many airports" ("Newsbriefs," 1989).
With the regional jet, regional airlines will be
able to establish hubs in cities like Billings, MT;
Norfolk, VA; Oklahoma City, OK; and Reno,
NV, among others. Such regional hubs have
the potential to "bleed off' demand from the
larger, congested hubs. Carlos da Silva agrees
that new hubs will appear and points to
Comair's hub at Orlando when he said, 'Who
would have thought a year ago that Orlando
would be an important hub for them?" (Fotos,
1989a). In addition, many city-pair markets
such as Tucson-Los Angeles and Buffalo-
Toronto will provide attractive opportunities for
regional and inter-regional point-to-point
service. Utilized properly, the new regional jets
could greatly enhance the range of competitive
services that will be offered by the regional
airlines. Critical to the development of the
regional jet has been the development of new
~ technology high-bypass-ratioturbofan engines.
These engines are being engineered for the
high-cycle, low-maintenance demands of
regional passenger transport and will attain
near turboprop levels of economy while
prOViding the same operating parameters as
high thrust turbofans used on the large wide
body airplanes (Norris, 1990). Each of these
engines will utilize new materials, including
ceramic reinforced alloys. Direct operating
costs, including engine maintenance and fuel
cost, are expected to decrease substantially.
The Canadair RJ, a stretch derivative of the
Canadair Challenger business jet, is the first of
the regional jets (see Table 4 next page). The
fuselage has been stretched 20 feet and more
emergency exits have been added. The wing
has the same supercritical section, a three foot
extension at each tip, including winglet, and is
equipped with new high-lift devices. These
modifications will provide the airplane with
good short field take-off performance with a
range of 873 n.m. and a 48 passenger load. A
number of additional changes will be made to
enhance maintainability and economy of
operation. Canadair is selling the airplane as a
50-seater with 31 inch seat pitch, but in reality,
it will be a much better 46-seater for the
planned route stage lengths. Canadair also
plans to develop a 70 seat version of the RJ
(Gould, 1989b; Ramsden, 1989b).
A strong competitor in this class will be the
Embraer EMB-145, a 45-48 seat aircraft now
under development. Carlos da Silva notes that
the EMB-145 is being developed with all
possible speed to avoid losing sales to the
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Table 4
Comparison of Turbofan Aircraft /III
PERFORMANCE
MAX PAYLOAD LOOORVG:
AIRCRAFT TYPE MAX CRUISE MAX SEATING (Lbs.) WITH FULL
TANKS ENGINEOO SPEED(Kts) PITCH(Ins.) RANGE(n.m.) R.B.T~
+ Canadair RJ 2 x 9,220 Ib.t. CF34-3A 460 50/31 10,000/1,240 8,220/1,574
++ EMS 145 2 x 7,150 Ib.t. GMA3007 440 50/31 11,376n50 7,385/1,650
Fokker60 2 x 14,000 Ib.t GMA3014 or BR 700 440 60/32 N/A N/A
BAe RJ70 4 x 6,970 Ib.t 430 80/32 8,426/1,733 7,355/3,(XXJ*
BAeRJ80 ALF502R-5 or LF 507 430 80/32 8,426/1,733
++ MPC75- 2 x 14,000 Ib.t. GMA3014 or BR700 500 80-130/32 N/A N/A
TU334 2 x 16,700 Ib.t. LOT. D-436 500 90/32 N/A N/A
ill Compiled from various issues of Flight International and Aviation Week & Space Technology.
+ These aircraft contain a high level of new technology.
++ These aircraft contain the highest level of new technology.
00 The engine manufacturers are: BR=BMW/Rolls Royce partnership; BMA=General Motors Allison; ALF/LF=Textron Lycoming;
LOT= Lotarev of Russia.
* Payload and range are for the basic BAe146-100, which will be the airframe for the RJ70 and RJ8O.
- MBS is now a part of Deutsche Aerospace (DASA) and will join with France's Aerospatiale and Italy's Alenia to build an 80-130
seat airframe based on the MPC75. Catie will continue to participate but at a lesser level.
Canadair RJ and claims the EMB-145 will have
several advantages over other regionals jets.
For example, it will require lower operating
costs on routes shorter than originally
estimated. Market studies by Embraer indicate
that on route stage lengths of 160-180 n.m.,
the EMB-145 will have lower operating costs
than many turboprops. Part of this can be
attributed to the faster flying speeds of the jet.
While costs per hour are lower for turboprops,
the turbofan powered EMB-145 will spend less
time in the air on the same route. This
advantage increases as the stage-lengths
become longer. Other advantages that might
be exploited by Embraer include its experience
with the regional airlines and the high level of
commonality between the EMB-145, the EMB-
120, and the CBA-123. Seventy-five percent of
the two new aircraft are common with the
Brasilia (Fotos, 1989b). Embraer will offer a
complete line from which regional airline
managers will be able to select to meet their
specific route needs.
Several larger regional aircraft are under
development and will be available before 1995;
the BAe RJ70 and RJ80, the Fokker 60, the
MPC-75, and the TU-334. A Japanese
consortium of Fuji, Kawasaki, Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries plans entry with the YSX. Finally,
Douglas Aircraft is planning a new regional jet
based on its existing MD-87, but with all-
composite DC-9-30 size wing (Warwick, 1990).
British Aerospace is promoting the RJ 70 on
the basis of flexibility and comfort. It will have
an 800-1 ,000 nautical mile stage-length ability
which will allow point-to-point service,
bypassing congested hubs. The manufacturer
claims the aircraft costs less then the Canadair
RJ on a per seat basis, and will break even on
a 300 n.m. route while carrying only 30
passengers. The RJ70 could fly in early 1991
if adequate orders are placed. The RJ80 is the
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same airframe as the RJ70, but is powered by
an upgraded LF507 to give it longer stage-
length capability with 80 passengers ("BAe
Tests ... ,11 1990)
The Fokker 60 is a 60 seat aircraft that is
being marketed as a "hub raider. 11 Fokker is
launching this aircraft based on what is seen
as an emerging tendency towards greater
competition between hubs in the United States
and Europe. Management at Fokker believes
that, as airlines compete to increase their
catchment area, "hub raiding" and "hub
bypassingll will become prevalent. The Fokker
60 will use the Fokker 50 fuselage cross-
section to ensure that the aircraft will not be
faced with what management sees as the "too-
small dimensions and capacity of the regional
jets and high-speed propjets currently under
development" (Moxon, 1990). Airplane
configuration will be similar to the high-wing,
high-tail BAe-146, but with two high bypass
engines instead of four. Speed will be in
excess of 400 kts. at 25,000 feet, and the
aircraft will have the ability to fly stage-lengths
of about 1200 miles. The cockpit and avionics
package will be derived from the Fokker 50
with considerable commonality (Moxon, 1990).
The MPC-75 is under development for the
People's Republic of China by MPC Aircraft
GMBH, a partnership between China National
Aero Technology Import and Export
Corporation (CATIC) (20% ownership) and
Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB now
DASA) (80% ownership). The MPC will be a
state-of-the-art aircraft carrying about 80
passengers at Mach 0.76 over a route stage-
length of 1500 n.m. (Middleton, 1989). The Tu-
334 is very similar and is in manufacture by
Tupolev in Russia with the first airplanes to be
delivered to Aeroflot (eventually to be available
for export) (Postlethwaite, 1989). Initially, both
the MPC-75 and the Tu-334 will find a market
in less developed countries, but over time they
will incorporated into the fleets of regionals in
advanced countries. Not all of these entries will
be successful in the market place, but the
development projects that do succeed will
have an impact on the competitive structure of
the airline industry in the United States and in
other parts of the world.
SUMMARY: CONCLUSION AND POLICY
IMPUCATIONS
. Much of the discussion of airline competition
and airport congestion since airline
deregulation has been undertaken without fully
considering the potential impact of emerging
technology on the industry's supply side,
especially with respect to factor indivisibility.
Technology has significantly affected the way
factor inputs are utilized in airline operations by
increasing both productivity and factor
substitutability. Similarly, technology
development has promoted the current bias
among the major airlines toward the operation
of larger, long-haul luxury jet aircraft, which led
to a service/capacity dilemma and played a
pervasive role in the development of the
current highly concentrated hub-and-spoke
dominated industry structure.
The overall influence of technology on the
industry is, therefore, characterized as mixed.
While the airline industry has become a viable
and popular mode for passenger
transportation, the level of competition among
the airlines has diminished. The industry is now
dominated by a relatively few -major airlines,
each operating key airport hubs. However,
technology developments at the lower end of
the airframe industry have the potential to
change existing industry structure. Of particular
interest is the impact of technology on the
economics and competitive viability of regional
airlines.
Current developments in turboprop and
turbofan technology are enhancing the
competitive potential of regional airlines by
providing smaller aircraft that have better
economy of operation, are faster, provide
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greater comfort, are perceived as safer, and and competition. The goal should be pro-
have greater customer appeal. The problem of competitive with the probable discontinuance
capital equipment indivisibility is, at least in of marketing/operating agreements and the
part, overcome. The smaller carriers now have outright divestment of ownership by the
the potential to enter new market point-to-point majors. The antitrust laws should be strictly
routes, and the ability to form new hubs at enforced.
medium size airports, and to provide service at The impact of public policy on employee
seat-mile cost approaching the level of larger relations in the industry is an issue which can
carriers. That·, factor will- improve ,industry.· be documented by a number of case studies.
competition and reduce the level of congestion The most recent example is Eastern Airlines
at major hub airports, which should benefit ("Regional Airlines ...., 1989). (This is not to
travelers in numerous ways. Strategic use of say that management handled the situation in
this new technology will depend on many a correct manner.) The DOT, Congress, and
operational and public policy factors. other agencies with regulatory responsibility
Public policy considerations are, perhaps, the over the airlines must recognize that market
most important to the successful use of the forces will not control an industry on the
new technology in .developing competitive demand side when artificial constraints exist in
strategies of the regionals. Perhaps the the acquisition of factors. When factor input
greatest barrier to improvements in competition prices, wages, and salaries are perfectly
from the regional carriers are the marketing flexible, they will move instantaneously to clear
and operating agreements between major and the market at all times. Unions and the many
regional airlines. By 1988, the major airlines existing restraints in labor law block a free flow
had gained some form of influence over 48 of of the labor factor, especially pilots and
the 50 largest regional airlines. The regionals mechanics.
are used to provide traffic feed into the majors' Other public policy issues include the
hub airports. At the same time, control by the allocation of slots at major hubs to regional
majors reduces the competitive threat of carriers, the pricing of scarce airport capacity,
regional airlines (Poling, 1987; Rose, 1988). and the continuance of essential air service.
Often, the regionals still maintain sufficient Ultimately, public policy should be continuous,
operating control to undertake regional proactive, and directed at avoiding all artificial
hubbing or hub bypassing strategies, but their constraints whether the constraints arise from
competitive opportunities are definitely limited marketing/operating agreements between
by the prevalence of marketing/operating major airlines and regional carriers, or from the
agreements. The Department ofTransportation use of computer reservation systems and
(DOT) and Congress must examine the frequent flyer programs.
competitive implications of the various types of From an operational standpoint, human
agreements currently in use. The current resource management is second only to the
benefits of increased traffic feed for the majors public policy issues. Technology must be
and the greater visibility for the regionals, must integrated with the work force, and employee
be weighed against the benefits to the system: development is key. Historically, the industry
the potential to reduce congestion at major has a very poor record in managing employee
hubs; the potential to provide better overall relations. Cutting edge technology will not
service; and the potential to increase operating compensate for poor management practice.
efficiency through increased market flexibility Human capital has the potential to be a firm's
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greatest strength, and must be treated as well,
if not better than, other operating assets. It is
more important than financial management,
and, when integrated with technology
investment, a firm can gain significant strategic
advantage.
Operational considerations dictate that new
aircraft must be used effectively as well as
efficiently. Aircraft- -configuration 4represents a .
very important operation consideration--
regional airlines must avoid the temptation to
place too many seats on the new aircraft in
efforts to improve immediate returns. While the
new aircraft are considerably faster and more
comfortable with respect to cabin noise and
vibration, seating comfort remains critical to the
achievement of a high level of passenger
acceptance. Avoiding the tendency to add
seats is necessary to increase passenger
appeal.
Further, the selection of markets to be
targeted by the regionals is crucial. Route
characteristics that should be considered
include point-to-point demand, congestion and
concentration at the major hub to be
bypassed, and stage-length. Regionals will find
the greatest competitive opportunities where
(a) point-to-point demand is sufficient to fly one
of the new regional aircraft, but insufficient to
support larger jet aircraft, (b) the hub to be
bypassed is highly congested, and (c) the
stage-length ranges between 200 to 1,000
nautical miles.
The future for regional airlines appears
extremely bright; however, it will not be without
many challenges, for management must
develop good employees to integrate with the
much improved (and continuing to improve)
flight equipment. It is also essential that
management become proactive in the public
sector as well as within the organization.
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